研究报告丨对乌克兰危机的认识以及中国在和平进程中的角色和作用(二)

作者：毛竞、吴昊

课题组成员：张婷宇、陈紫宜

报告由五部分构成。第一部分的内容是“美国特朗普政府的政策调整与中国政府原则立场的稳定”，主要从“俄乌矛盾的根本对立”“欧洲立场的牵制作用”“美国国内政治的制约”三个方面，分析了特朗普政府的政策调整为何未能达到预期目标，以及中国坚持既有原则立场的原因。

第二部分的内容是“其他相关地区的热点问题与中国的政策主张”，根据同俄乌冲突的关联度，我们首先界定了相关地区热点问题的范围，其次阐明了这些热点问题与战争的互动及其性质，最后解释了中国对这些热点问题的政策主张有哪些共同点和差异点，以及原因是什么。

第三部分的内容是“俄乌冲突停火的前景和保障与中国可能的选择”，从历史和现实相结合的角度分析了达成停火的条件，随后分析了保障停火的需求，在此基础上概述了中国维和部队的规模结构、武器装备、实战经验等，对中国参与停火保障的可能性及方式作出了判断。

第四部分的内容是“构建未来欧洲安全架构与中国的参与度”，报告回顾了欧洲安全架构形成的历史，从中提炼了促成欧洲安全架构的三大类九个主要因素，然后以此为对照预测构建未来欧洲安全架构的条件，并据此对中国可能的参与程度进行了判断。

第五部分的内容是“中欧合作空间变窄及止跌企稳的建议”，分析了为何中国与欧洲的合作空间变得愈加有限，指出避免中欧关系持续下滑的当务之急也是现实做法是通过技术性合作逐步积累互信。

主要发现

·在俄乌双方战争目标均无实质变化，以及二者都有能力继续战争的情况下，停火的可能性非常渺茫。主要原因是，俄乌冲突是一场关于世界观、价值观、存亡观的战争，靠交易不可能达成和平；欧洲对这场冲突的安全认知和政策措施已经机制化，很难做出更多的妥协和让步；在美国推动的新一轮和平谈判中，为改善与俄罗斯的关系，特朗普政府对乌克兰施加了巨大压力，但美国国内的政治现状及特朗普总统的执政风格，阻碍政策目标的实现。

·中国的战争观认为，战争说到底“是两种哲学、两种智慧以及两种道德和勇气的较量”，只有在这方面取得谅解，真正的和平才能实现，这可能构成了中国坚持现有原则和方式的观念基础。

·基于俄乌冲突的根源、目标和实质，实现停火的途径是当事国失去继续战斗的能力。虽然不能排除各方均有停火的意愿，但在一个较长时期内，所谓停火谈判更多的是塑造于己有利的战争条件。

·由于上述原因，俄乌冲突停火保障类似于执行作战性质的任务，风险很高、难度很大，与普通的维和行动存在本质区别。根据中国参与国际维和的一贯政策和中国维和部队的结构、经验、装备等，在最理想情况下大概也只能派出排雷排爆、医疗救治、警戒护卫、保护平民、工程建设等轻型部队，承担传统性的任务。

·俄乌冲突确实与其他一些地区热点问题存在直接或间接的关联，但这些地区的相关国家处理俄乌冲突的实际政策大多出于功利性考虑，缺乏战略上的协调性。这一方面限制了俄乌冲突的外溢效应，另一方面其他热点问题对俄乌冲突的影响也有限。也许正是基于这种判断，中国对不同地区热点问题的政策主张有同有异、有轻有重。

·俄乌冲突严重破坏了过去欧洲与俄罗斯之间的合作型安全架构，恢复原有安全构架已无可能，北约与俄罗斯的对抗将构成欧洲安全的主要矛盾，欧安组织将进一步边缘化，在震荡中发展成为欧洲安全的典型特征，今后5年将处于一个较高的风险期。

·中国与欧洲的当务之急是为双方关系尽快止跌回稳创造条件。现实的做法是将技术性合作作为支点，开展“渐进式协作”，即通过一系列可量化、可复盘的小步骤，逐步累积互信与公共产品，而非追求一次性的大交易。

研究思路与方法

基于上述原因，我们决定把分析现象背后的逻辑作为报告的重点。理由有三：其一，国内外同行提出的意见建议虽然看似具体，实则大多触及了思维、认知、机制等方面的问题；其二，尽管俄乌冲突因特朗普政府调整政策出现了较大变化，但中国政府的原则立场并没有改变，这显然需要在更深的层面作出解释。其三，俄乌冲突已持续近四年，各国对这场战争的认知、采取的措施很可能已经固化，研究分析不能忽视这一点。

报告主要采用了三种研究方法：一是历史逻辑与现实逻辑相结合。战争总是矛盾长期积累和演进的结果，当事方和相关方如何认识矛盾的根源、本质、影响和后果，以及相互之间如何解读彼此的意图，直接决定了他们的立场、政策和行为，而这只有通过理清历史逻辑才能做到，因为认知很大程度上是历史经验造就的。对报告中的所有问题，我们均以此为主轴展开论述，尽可能使分析和研判更深刻一些。二是案例解析和建模。这主要体现在对构建未来欧洲安全构架的看法上。任何安全架构都不是凭空产生的，战前的欧洲安全架构奠基于1975年的《赫尔辛基最后文件》，解析当年欧洲安全架构形成的条件，对比建立未来欧洲安全架构所需的要素，可以为研判包括中国在内的相关国家的参与程度提供重要参考。三是对话交流和专家访谈。为吸取国内外专家学者的见解，课题组访谈了来自中国外交、军事和智库界人员，并组织中国前政要、退役军官、学者和乌克兰前政要、学者、社会实践者、欧洲外交官和智库学者以及俄罗斯智库学者进行了面对面对话。

本报告2025年12月定稿。

English Version：

Understanding of the Ukraine crisis and China’s potential role in the peace process 

Abstract

Since the publication of the report “China’s Contributions for a sustainable peace solution in Ukraine”by the Grandview Institution at the end of last year, both domestic and international colleagues have raised many valuable comments and suggestions. Some of these are extensions of the content of the report; others are due to changes in the situation and require further responses. This has led us to consider writing a second report in the series. Frankly, we believe the main conclusions of the first report are still valid. For example, the two most likely scenarios are that the war will either continue at its current intensity or escalate; although the role of the United States cannot be underestimated, the course and outcome of the war ultimately depend on the two conflicting parties; the Chinese government will continue to insist on resolving the issue within a political and diplomatic framework; and cooperation on functional issues remains a realistic choice for both China and Europe, etc. However, in order to respond to the opinions of both domestic and international colleagues, we must deepen and expand on these main conclusions rather than simply restating the facts and repeating arguments. 

The report consists of five sections. The first part is titled “Policy Adjustments of the U.S. Trump Administration and the Stability of China’s Principled Stance,”which mainly analyzes, from three aspects-the fundamental contradictions of the war, the constraining role of Europe's stance, and the constraints of U.S. domestic politics-why the policy adjustments of the Trump administration failed to achieve their expected goals, and why China adheres to its existing principled stance. The second part is titled “Other Regional Hotspots and China’s Policies and Proposals.”Based on the relevance to the war, we first define the scope of related regional hotspots, then explain the interaction and nature of these hotspots with the war, and finally analyze the commonalities and differences in China’s policy proposals for these hotspots and the reasons behind them. The third part is titled “Prospects for a Ceasefire, Its Guarantees, and China’s Possible Choices.”From both historical and contemporary perspectives, it analyzes the conditions for achieving a ceasefire, then examines the requirements for guaranteeing a ceasefire. Based on this, we outline the size, structure, equipment, combat experience of China’s peacekeeping forces, and make an assessment on China’s possible involvement in ceasefire guarantees and methods. The fourth part is titled “Constructing the Future European Security Architecture and China’s Level of Participation,”which reviews the history of the formation of the European security architecture, extracts three major categories and nine key factors that contributed to the formation of the European security architecture, and then predicts the conditions for constructing the future European security architecture. Based on this, it assesses China’s possible level of participation. The fifth part is titled “The Narrowing Space for China-Europe Cooperation and Recommendations for Stabilization.”It analyzes why China-Europe cooperation has become increasingly limited and points out that the urgent task to avoid the continued deterioration of China-Europe relations is to gradually build mutual trust through technical cooperation.

Key Findings

·With neither side in the war having made substantial changes in their goals, and both having the capability to continue the war, the possibility of a ceasefire is very low. The main reason is that it is a war about worldviews, values, and survival; peace cannot be achieved through negotiations alone. Europe’s security perception and policy measures regarding this war have already been institutionalized, making it difficult to make further compromises or concessions. In the peace negotiations pushed by the United States, the Trump administration placed great pressure on Ukraine to improve relations with Russia, but the domestic political situation in the U.S. and Trump’s style of governance hindered the realization of policy goals.

·China’s view of the war holds that war is essentially “a contest of two philosophies, two wisdoms, and two morals and two courages.”Only through mutual understanding on these aspects can true peace be achieved. This may form the basis for China’s insistence on its current principles and methods.

·Based on the origins, goals, and essence of the war, the only way to achieve a ceasefire is when the parties lose the ability to continue fighting. Although a willingness to ceasefire may exist among the parties, ceasefire negotiations over a prolonged period are more likely to shape favorable war conditions rather than immediately stop the fighting.

·For the above reasons, guaranteeing a ceasefire is akin to executing a military mission, involving high risks and great difficulty. This is fundamentally different from typical peacekeeping actions. According to China’s consistent policy on international peacekeeping and the structure, experience, and equipment of its peacekeeping forces, China could only send light forces for traditional peacekeeping tasks at best, such as mine clearance, medical treatment, surveillance, civilian protection, and engineering construction.

·The war does have direct or indirect links with some other regional hotspot issues, but the actual policies of the relevant countries regarding the war are mostly driven by pragmatic considerations, lacking strategic coordination. This both limits the spillover effects of the war and weakens the impact of other hotspots on the conflict. Out of this reason, China’s policy proposals for different regional hotspots have both commonalities and differences, varying in importance.

·The war has severely damaged the cooperative security framework between Europe and Russia, and it is no longer possible to restore the original security framework. The confrontation between NATO and Russia will become the primary contradiction in European security, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) will be further marginalized. Developing amidst turbulence will be a typical feature of European security in the future. The next five years will be a period of relatively high risk.

· The immediate priority for China and Europe is to create conditions for stabilizing their relationship. The practical approach is to use technical cooperation as leverage, conducting “gradual cooperation”through a series of measurable and revisable small steps, gradually accumulating mutual trust and public goods, rather than aiming for a “grand deal”.

Research Approach

Based on the reasons above, we decided to focus the report on analyzing the underlying logic behind the phenomena. There are three reasons for this: First, while the opinions and suggestions from domestic and international colleagues address issues related to cognition and mechanisms; Second, although the war has undergone significant changes due to the Trump administration’s policy adjustments, China’s principled stance has not changed, and this clearly needs to be explained at a deeper level; Third, the war has lasted nearly four years, and the perception of this war by various countries and the measures they have taken are likely to have solidified, which must be considered in the research analysis.

The report primarily uses three research methods: First, combining historical logic and real-world logic. War is always the result of long-term accumulation and evolution of contradictions. How the parties and relevant stakeholders understand the origins, essence, impact, and consequences of contradictions, and how they interpret each other’s intentions, directly determines their positions, policies, and actions. This can only be achieved by sorting out the historical logic because cognition is largely shaped by historical experience. All issues in the report are discussed with this as the main axis to make the analysis and assessment more profound. Second, case studies and modeling. This is mainly reflected in the views on constructing the future European security framework. Any security framework is not created in a vacuum; the pre-war European security framework was based on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Analyzing the conditions for the formation of the European security framework at that time and comparing the elements needed to establish the future European security framework provides important references for assessing the participation of relevant countries, including China. Third, dialogues and expert interviews. To gain insights from domestic and international experts, scholars, and officials, the research team conducted interviews and dialogues with people engaged in diplomacy, military, academia and think tanks, which include scholars, mediation practitioners, diplomats, former government officials, retired military officers from China, Ukraine, Europe and Russia. 

(This report was finalized in December 2025. Full report will be published on the official website of Grandview Institution)

Author: Mao Jing&Wu hao

Project members: Zhang Tingyu& Chen Ziyi