美国信托业发展研究报告——以中小型信托机构的兴衰与复兴为线索说明：本文基于一手史料（政府文件、地标档案、SEC年报、法律评论、行业白皮书）撰写。注释以〔1〕〔2〕……标注。可与文末“参考文献与史料原文摘录”逐一对应。 本文引用数据数据截至2026年7月。 一、演进脉络：五个阶段的划分未必截然，但大致勾勒了方向 将美国信托业两百年历史划分为五个阶段，固然是事后总结的方便；但若不这样切分，又很难看清中小机构命运的起伏——它们时而站到舞台中央，时而被挤到边缘，又时而借制度缝隙重新冒头。这种循环往复，倒是真实可感的。 （一）萌芽期（1812—1864）：人寿保险公司“顺便”做起信托 美国是世界上第一个将信托受托人“法人化”的国家。不过最初并非有意为之——1812年宾夕法尼亚人寿保险与年金公司在费城成立，二十余年后才获准兼营信托业务，被后来的金融史家追认为美国信托公司的源头〔2〕。更常被写进教科书的标志性事件发生在1822年：纽约州向农民火灾保险与贷款公司授予信托职能，该公司1836年更名为农民贷款与信托公司，其章程中“承接并执行任何已经或可能以契据设立的信托”一语，被认为是历史上第一次由法人公司取得管理信托的权力〔2〕。 此后这类机构缓慢增加：纽约人寿保险与信托公司（1830）、俄亥俄人寿保险与信托公司（1834）、吉拉德人寿保险与信托公司（1836）相继出现。等到1853年的美国信托公司才是真正意义上的第一家专营信托业务的公司。一个容易被忽略的细节是：美国信托公司、1889年的北方信托、1907年的贝西默信托，最初都是以“私人信托公司”形态起家的——专为单一家族提供服务，后来才逐步向公众开放〔23〕。这意味着，中小型、家族型机构本就是美国信托业的“出厂设置”，而非后来才出现的变异。 这一时期的信托公司普遍走“人寿保险＋信托”的混业路线，主业是遗产管理与个人财产受托。公众认知相当有限和模糊，用当时一位观察者的话说，“甚至典当行和贷款机构也自称信托公司”〔1〕——这个行业的门槛在当时更像一层窗户纸。 （二）镀金时代（1864—1913）：野蛮生长 1863—1864年《国民银行法》建立了全国性银行体系，但有一项关键限制：国民银行不得经营信托业务。这个制度空档，为州特许信托公司留下了巨大的套利空间。 数字本身就说明了相当问题。1864至1875年间新增信托公司约40家，1890年全国至少有63家活跃机构〔1〕；到1900年已超过500家，1924年更膨胀至2,562家〔3〕。爆发式增长的秘密在于一种“类银行却非银行”的监管地位——它们吸收存款、发放贷款，却不受国民银行准备金要求和清算纪律的约束。1899年纽约州信托公司的数据颇有代表性：“以信托名义持有的存款”为2.61亿美元，“一般存款”却高达3.32亿美元——后者本质上就是商业银行业务。宾夕法尼亚等州则通过1881、1885、1895年的连续立法，逐步将信托公司的存款与放贷权力合法化〔5〕。 缺乏最后贷款人保护、准备金单薄——这个风险组合终于在1907年引爆。危机的导火索是海因策—莫尔斯铜业股票操纵案失败，与之关联密切的纽约第三大信托公司尼克博克信托公司遭挤兑，10月22日停止兑付。恐慌迅速蔓延至美国信托公司等机构〔6〕。J.P.摩根在其私人图书馆召集银行家与信托公司总裁彻夜谈判，紧急筹集2,500万美元流动性池，才勉强遏制住挤兑潮〔6〕。代价仍然沉重：大宗商品价格下跌21%，破产金额上升47%，失业率从2.8%飙升至8%〔7〕。 后世学者常把1907年危机与2008年相提并论——两次都始于“缺乏监管、负债无保险的新型金融中介”遭遇挤兑〔6〕。某种意义上，1907年的中小信托公司扮演了和2008年影子银行类似的角色。这场危机最直接的制度后果，就是1913年《联邦储备法》的诞生〔7〕。 （三）制度重塑期（1913—1974）：银行信托部兴起，中小机构第一次退场 1913年《联邦储备法》第11(k)条（Pub. L. 63-43）做了一个看似技术性的安排：授权联邦储备委员会以“特别许可”方式允许国民银行经营受托业务。1918年修正案进一步确立了“竞争中性”原则——凡州法允许州银行、信托公司从事的受托业务，国民银行均可从事〔8〕〔9〕。 这个条款的立法背景颇有意思。1918年纽约州《银行法》第223条禁止国民银行担任财务与支付代理人，而同为受托机构的州特许信托公司却没有这个限制。国会通过第11(k)条，初衷是拉平竞争格局。但 unintended consequence 显而易见：国民银行一旦获得信托权限，大型商业银行的“一站式”优势立刻对独立信托公司形成了制度性替代。1962年，国民银行信托业务的审批监管权从美联储移交货币监理署（OCC），进一步理顺了联邦层面的监管链条。 银行信托部的兴起从根本上改写了行业格局。客户可以在同一家机构同时办理存款、贷款与信托服务，独立信托公司的存在价值被大幅削弱。大量老牌信托公司被商业银行兼并——最具象征意义的一幕发生在1929年：历史最悠久的农民贷款与信托公司并入纽约国民城市银行（花旗银行前身）〔4〕。美国信托公司从此由“独立金融机构”逐步变成“大型商业银行集团的一项职能”〔3〕。1960年代，货币监理署署长萨克森（James Saxon）推动扩张，1962至1965年间批准了513家新设国民银行牌照，并“允许信托部门提供全系列的受托服务”〔10〕——银行系信托的主导地位至此彻底确立。 （四）集中化期（1974—2000）：规模经济的胜利，小机构被挤出核心业务 1970年代以后，养老金、员工福利计划等机构化业务兴起，受托业务的重心从“个人信托”转向“机构信托”。托管、证券结算、信托会计等技术环节具有显著的固定成本特征，规模经济效应非常明显。大型货币中心银行凭借系统投入优势不断蚕食中小机构的业务地盘。 中小银行信托部陷入一种尴尬处境：自建系统力不从心，放弃业务又不甘心。第三方外包产业正是在这个夹缝中生长出来的。SEI公司1994年推出信托后台整体外包服务，“最初以社区银行为目标市场”，集中处理信托会计、收益归集、证券结算与客户报表；到1998年底已签约62家外包客户，其TRUST 3000系统在第三方供应商中销量居首〔20〕。SEI在年报中坦承，该产品线“最主要的战略问题是银行业的持续合并，可能减少潜在客户数量或使现有客户消失”〔20〕——这句话精确刻画了1980至90年代中小信托机构被并购浪潮吞噬的处境。 1978年《国民银行法》第27(a)条确认了“非存款型国民信托银行”的合法地位，为不吸收存款的专责信托机构保留了联邦牌照通道〔9〕。不过在整个1970—90年代，这条通道还相当狭窄，远未成为主流。 （五）复兴期（1983至今）：立法竞争打开的一扇窗 1980年代起，以特拉华、南达科他为先导的“信托立法竞争”彻底改写了行业版图。中小独立信托公司借此重获生机——这大概是美国信托业两百年中最出人意料的转折。 1978年联邦最高法院Marquette案判决后，州长詹克洛（William Janklow）于1981年推动废除高利贷利率上限，成功吸引花旗银行将信用卡业务及约3,000个岗位迁往苏福尔斯〔14〕〔15〕。但真正让信托业发生质变的，是1983年南达科他通过SDCL § 43-5-8，成为全美第一个废除“反永续规则”的州。法条只有一句话：“普通法上的反永续规则在本州不予适用”〔13〕〔25〕。这句话的威力，当时恐怕没多少人充分意识到。 1995年南达科他出台信托公司条例，同年花旗信托南达科他公司设立，成为该州信托业的“发射台”〔15〕〔16〕；1997年詹克洛设立“州长信托行政与改革特别工作组”，目标毫不掩饰——“确立并维持南达科他作为美国首要信托法域的地位”〔14〕。同年还颁布了全美第一部信托保护人成文法（SDCL § 55-1B-6）与自益资产保护信托条例〔13〕。其他州迅速跟进。特拉华1995年出台永续信托法作为回应〔15〕；1997至2000年间，阿拉斯加、亚利桑那、伊利诺伊、缅因、马里兰、新泽西、俄亥俄、罗德岛相继授权永续信托；到2005年底，科罗拉多、佛罗里达、密苏里、内布拉斯加、内华达、新罕布什尔、犹他、弗吉尼亚、怀俄明也纷纷加入〔18〕。 到2013年，南达科他已拥有65家持牌信托公司，信托资产超过1,200亿美元——同期明尼苏达州仅3家非银行信托牌照、合计资产70余亿美元，且2005年后未再发新牌〔12〕。南达科他以86家公立与私人非存款型信托公司位居全美第一〔17〕，如今信托公司超过100家，而全州人口不足百万〔16〕。据国际调查记者同盟“潘多拉文件”披露，南达科他信托客户资产在十年间翻了两番，达3,600亿美元；2000至2019年间美国新增200余只外国信托，其中81只——近半数——注册在南达科他〔19〕。 这些新设信托公司绝大多数是中小型独立机构。立法竞争直接为中小信托公司创造了制度性的生存空间。 二、中小机构的兴衰与转型 （一）三种形态 理解美国中小型信托机构，不妨从三种形态入手。 独立信托公司——不吸收存款、专责受托的州特许或联邦特许机构。早期的美国信托公司是这类，当代南达科他、内华达、田纳西等地的大量非存款型信托公司也属此类。州特许者由州银行监管部门监管，国民信托银行由OCC监管，一般均无FDIC存款保险〔24〕。 社区银行信托部——依附于中小商业银行的信托部门。二战后至1970年代是个人信托业务的主力，也是后来外包服务的主要买家〔20〕。 私人信托公司——为单一家族服务的信托机构，“系州特许实体，设立目的专为向单一家族提供信托与受托服务”〔21〕〔23〕。可区分为受监管与不受监管两类；怀俄明、内华达、南达科他、田纳西、新罕布什尔是主要法域〔21〕。受监管私人信托公司最低资本要求一般在20至50万美元，面向公众的零售信托公司则需40万至200万美元——南达科他与新罕布什尔20万美元的门槛为全美最低〔22〕。 （二）两次衰落 第一次衰落（1913—1960年代）源于制度性替代。国民银行获得信托权限后，银行信托部以一站式优势取代独立信托公司，行业通过并购向银行集中〔3〕〔4〕。这是一场由立法变动引发的结构性位移。 第二次挤压（1970—90年代）则源于成本结构。信托会计、托管结算、合规审计的高固定成本使小规模信托部难以盈亏平衡，外包成为唯一可行的生存方式——SEI的市场定位“从初创信托部到管理100亿美元资产的信托部”恰恰说明中小机构是外包经济的天然客户〔20〕。这是一场由规模经济驱动的淘汰赛。 两次衰落的共性在于：中小机构无法在“全功能、重资产”的竞争维度上与大机构抗衡。但1983年之后，情况发生了变化——中小机构找到了不需要“正面硬扛”的生存策略。 （三）复兴机制：立法套利、职能解绑与利基专业化 注册地套利。信托法律关系高度可移动——“信托极为灵活，且委托人有财力货比三家，这一行业天然适合（州际）竞争”〔18〕。中小机构把注册地迁往无州所得税、允许永续信托、承认资产保护信托的法域，即可获得对大型传统机构的产品优势。南达科他“不征收任何公司、信托或个人所得税，且宪法禁止征收遗产与死亡转移税”〔17〕——这句话本身就是最强的招商广告。 职能解绑。现代定向信托法把受托人职责拆分为行政管理、投资指示、分配决策等模块。中小信托公司只需承担“行政受托人”角色，投资管理交由客户自聘的投资顾问——这样就能以极轻的资产模式服务超高净值客户与外部资产管理人〔25〕。这个机制颇为关键，后面还会谈到。 利基专业化。从私人信托公司（家族治理）〔21〕〔23〕、集合投资信托受托、特殊目的实体担任信托顾问，到数字资产托管——中小机构在标准化大机构“不愿做、做不好”的细分市场中重建护城河。 （四）最新动向：金融科技与国民信托银行牌照 2021年1月，OCC附条件批准Anchorage Trust Company转为国民信托银行，成为首家获得联邦银行牌照的虚拟货币机构。配套的《第1176号解释函》推翻了延续37年的立场，确认国民信托银行可从事州法允许州信托公司从事的一切业务（包括非受托性质的托管业务），“这将使州信托公司转换为联邦牌照在权限层面大为便利”〔9〕。 2026年3月2日，OCC最终修订国民银行牌照规则（2026年4月1日生效），将国民信托银行的业务范围表述与《国民银行法》第27(a)条对齐为“信托公司的运营及相关活动”，确认其可从事非受托业务——这是在多家加密信托公司获批背景下，联邦层面对“窄牌照信托银行”的再度扩容〔24〕。中小新型机构借此获得全国性的联邦先发制人优势，对传统州立中小信托公司形成竞争压力，也引发州监管者通过《货币传输现代化示范法》等立法的反制〔24〕。 三、趋势：四条结构性主线 若把视野拉远，美国信托业的演化至少呈现出四条并行不悖的趋势。 （一）集中化与“解绑”并存：哑铃型结构 行业的一端是托管与机构业务向极少数巨头集中；另一端是个人与家族信托业务向大量“轻资产、强法域”的中小独立信托公司分散。连接两端的是外包与技术平台经济。SEI自1994年起的信托外包史证明，中小机构通过购买后台能力，可以把固定成本转化为可变成本，从而在巨头阴影下存活〔20〕。这种“哑铃型”结构，是美国信托业区别于日本、中国等以大型机构为主导的市场的显著特征。 （二）注册地竞争常态化：信托法成了州的“产业” 布兰代斯大法官关于州是“民主实验室”的论断，近年来被反复引用来解释信托法的州际竞争〔18〕。南达科他以常设立法机制（1997年的Trust Task Force延续至今）保持着“每届议会必有信托法更新”的节奏：1997年首部信托保护人法、2007年第三方自由裁量信托条例、2011年特殊目的实体担任信托顾问、2013年信托持有专属保险公司、2017年虚拟代表制度现代化、2025年SB 69增设“税务信托顾问”类别〔13〕〔26〕。信托立法本身已成为一种制度供给型产业，中小信托公司既是主要受益者，也是重要的游说力量。 （三）保密与透明化：张力在上升 硬币总有另一面。“潘多拉文件”显示，南达科他“如今在金融保密性上可与欧洲和加勒比那些以不透明著称的法域比肩”，部分信托资产与被指控侵犯人权、财务犯罪的外国人士相关〔19〕。ICIJ指出，部分信托迁入美国恰是对其他国家提高金融透明度的回应〔19〕。这意味着中小信托机构未来将面临实益所有权申报、反洗钱与国际信息交换的持续合规压力——保密优势的边际价值正在递减，虽然这个递减的速度尚不确定。 （四）需求侧的长周期支撑：史上最大规模的财富代际转移 埃森哲的研究估计，婴儿潮一代将在未来30至40年间向下一代转移约30万亿美元资产——“是世界历史上最大规模的财富转移”〔12〕。永续信托、隔代转移税豁免的永续化运用（2026年起联邦遗产税豁免额永久定为每人1,500万美元），使多代际信托架构的需求长盛不衰〔13〕。只要财富集中与代际转移的大趋势延续，为家族提供定制化受托架构的中小信托机构就拥有结构性的需求底盘——这个判断虽然听起来像常识，但常识往往最容易被忽视。 四、中小信托机构何以衰而复兴 前面的描述已经铺陈了史实和趋势。这一节换一个角度：中小信托机构何以衰而复兴。 （一）制度供给是总开关 美国“联邦—州”双重银行体系允许机构在州特许、联邦特许、存款型、非存款型之间选择监管身份——立法竞争由此成为可能。1913/1918年《联邦储备法》第11(k)条确立的“竞争中性”原则（国民银行可从事州法允许竞争机构从事的一切受托业务），本意是拉平银行与信托公司的竞争〔8〕〔9〕，却在百年后反向发挥作用：州只要修改信托法，就能为本地中小信托公司创造全国性的产品优势。 南达科他的成功不是孤例，而是一种范式——“一旦南达科他开始行动，其他州迅速跟进”〔18〕。这里的关键不在于某一项具体的立法，而在于制度竞争的机制本身：它使中小机构获得了一种“规则选择权”，而这在统一监管体制下是不可能存在的。 （二）成本结构决定了业务分层 信托业务的受托责任（行政、合规、报表）具有准公共品性质和高固定成本；投资决策则高度个性化，规模不经济。大机构赢在前者，小机构只能赢在后者。SEI年报中“使信托部管理层得以专注于拓展和服务客户”的外包逻辑〔20〕，本质上是一次产业链纵向分工：后台集中、前台分散。 定向信托立法则是这一分工的法律确认——它把“谁承担受托责任”与“谁做投资决策”正式分离，使轻资产中小信托公司获得合规的存在形式〔25〕。这个机制比单纯的业务外包更为根本：它改变的是法律结构，而不仅是运营流程。 （三）需求是被制度“制造”出来的 反永续规则的废除使信托资产得以永久豁免于联邦遗产税、赠与税与隔代转移税的逐代征收，“使信托资产价值得以更快增长”〔25〕。叠加无州所得税、资产保护、永久保密（南达科他法院可依申请永久封存信托诉讼文书〔12〕）等组合，形成了对传统法域的“制度降维”。各州对永续规则的连锁跟进〔18〕表明：中小信托机构的集聚首先是立法套利的产物，其次才是经营效率的产物。 （四）监管钟摆的摆动 1907年的教训表明，监管宽松期中小信托机构膨胀最快、脆弱性也最高——薄准备金、无最后贷款人、存款类负债，使其成为危机引信〔5〕〔6〕〔7〕；危机后的监管收紧（联储创立、银行信托部兴起、联邦存款保险）又最先压缩中小机构空间。当代的国民信托银行热与加密信托牌照扩容〔9〕〔24〕，正处于新一轮“宽松—扩容”阶段；潘多拉文件后的透明化压力〔19〕则是反向收紧的信号。 中小信托机构的命运，始终系于监管钟摆的位置——这个判断虽不新鲜，却值得反复提醒。 五、结论 回看美国信托业两百年，中小信托机构的轨迹大致可以概括为：兴起—引爆危机—被银行体系收编—借立法竞争复兴。这是一个循环，而一种非线性进步。若说有什么值得注意的经验，或许有三条。 第一，法人受托人制度（1822年农民贷款与信托公司的授权）的创新起源于中小机构。行业活力从来来自边缘而非中心。这一点在金融史中反复出现，但每次都被遗忘。 第二，中小机构的生存不取决于规模，而取决于制度差异与职能分工。立法竞争和定向信托创造了“小而专”的可持续商业模式。换言之，小机构不需要变成大机构的缩小版，它们需要的是找到大机构无法复制的制度空间。 第三，每一次中小机构的快速膨胀都伴随透明度与稳健性折价。1907年与潘多拉文件相隔114年，逻辑却惊人地相似。对观察任何法域的信托业而言，中小信托机构既是创新最前沿的传感器，也是风险最早的报警器。 这个悖论，大概还会继续下去。 参考文献与史料原文摘录 以下编号与正文〔〕内标注一一对应。每条附出处链接与英文原文摘录，可逐条查核。 〔1〕 Henry Wysham Lanier, A Century of Banking in New York 1822-1922, The Gilliss Press, 1922. 链接：http://www.searchengine.org.uk/dailyebook/A%20century%20of%20banking%20in%20New%20York%201822-1922%20(1922).pdf 原文摘录："As we have seen, the first trust company, the Farmers' Loan & Trust of to-day, was started as early as 1822. Eight years later the New York Life Insurance and Trust Co. entered the field, the Ohio Life Insurance & Trust was chartered in 1834, the Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities was authorized to undertake such business in 1836… Between 1864 and 1875 forty of the existing companies were added to the list. By 1890 there were at least sixty-three active concerns in the United States… even pawnbrokers and loan concerns had called themselves trust companies." 〔2〕 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States, Vol. 1: From Columbus to the Robber Barons, M.E. Sharpe, 2002. 链接：http://vnn1.online.fr/Cafeteria/FinancialAccountingBanking/A%20Financial%20History%20of%20the%20United%20States,%202002,%203%20vols/Vol.1-1492-1900-FromColumbustotheRobber_Barrons.pdf 原文摘录："Another early trust company was granted a charter in 1822. Originally named the Farmers' Fire Insurance and Loan Company, this New York company changed its name to the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company in 1836. It was granted the power to 'assume and execute any trust which has been, or may be, created by any deed.' Apparently, this was the first instance in which a corporation was given the power to manage a trust… The first company to act exclusively as a trust company was the United States Trust Company, which was established in New York in 1853." 〔3〕 "Die ontwikkeling van korporatiewe trusteeskap in Suid-Afrika…"（南非《Historia》期刊论文，含美国信托公司数量史料）, University of Pretoria. 链接：https://upjournals.up.ac.za/index.php/historia/article/download/1175/1072 原文摘录："In April 1822 het die staat van New York trustfunksies aan die Farmers' Fire Insurance and Loan Company (later bekend as die Farmers' Loan and Trust Company of New York) toegeken. Na 'n aanvanklike stadige begin, het die getalle van trustmaatskappye in die laaste kwart van die negentiende eeu aansienlik toegeneem en teen 1900 reeds 500 oorskry. Na 1900 was daar 'n ontploffing in trustmaatskappystigting en teen 1924 was daar reeds 2562 trustmaatskappye in Amerika." 〔4〕 New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, City Bank–Farmers Trust Company Building Designation Report. 链接：https://s-media.nyc.gov/agencies/lpc/lp/1941.pdf 原文摘录："The Farmers Loan and Trust Company, founded in 1822, was the first trust company to be organized in New York, and is said to be the first 'company of record to be incorporated for the purpose of executing trusts.'… During the 1920s, the National City Bank of New York… merged with the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company in 1929." 〔5〕 David Zaring, "Skinny Charters: Rebuilding the Banking Regulatory Perimeter," Iowa Journal of Corporation Law. 链接：https://jcl.law.uiowa.edu/sites/jcl.law.uiowa.edu/files/2025-03/Zaring_Final%20(1).pdf 原文摘录："By 1899, in New York, trust companies held as deposits in trust $261 million while holding as general deposits $332 million… In Pennsylvania, the state legislature recognized trusts' banking powers gradually—… and finally 'the power to receive deposits of money and any other personal property and to issue their obligations therefore…and to loan money on real and personal securities' in 1895. The 1907 financial crisis began with the Knickerbocker Trust, expanded to other New York trust banks, and rippled into the larger banking sector." 〔6〕 Carola Frydman, Eric Hilt & Lily Y. Zhou, "The Panic of 1907: JP Morgan, Trust Companies, and the Impact of the Financial Crisis," NBER Working Paper. 链接：https://docslib.org/doc/6472686/the-panic-of-1907-jp-morgan-trust-companies-and-the-impact-of-the 原文摘录："The Panic of 1907 originated in runs on a newly popular form of financial intermediary, trust companies, which faced little regulation and like other banks offered deposits that were not insured… the Panic of 1907 was deepened by the sudden failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company, the third-largest institution of its kind in New York City." 〔7〕 Eliane Kavoussi, "The Panic of 1907: A Human-Caused Crisis, or a Thunderstorm?" Harvard University (HistEcon) paper. 链接：https://histecon.fas.harvard.edu/crisis-next/1907/docs/Kavoussi-Panicof1907.pdf 原文摘录："After the full panic had run its course, commodity prices had fallen 21 percent, the dollar volume of bankruptcies had spiked by 47 percent, and unemployment had risen from 2.8 to 8 percent. Ultimately, the Panic of 1907—one of the most severe financial crises in the United States' history—led to increased financial regulation by the government and the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913." 〔8〕 U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, News Release NR-2000-90（12 CFR Part 9受托业务规则修订说明）, 2000. 链接：https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2000/nr-occ-2000-90a.pdf 原文摘录："The statutory authority for national banks to exercise fiduciary power is contained in 12 U.S.C. §§ 92a(a) and (b)… When Congress enacted the precursor to section 92a in 1913, it authorized the Federal Reserve Board (which regulated national bank fiduciary activities until 1962, when Congress transferred that authority to the OCC) to grant national banks the right to act in a fiduciary capacity 'under such rules and regulations as the board may prescribe.' Pub. L. 63-43 11(k), 30 Stat. 251 (1913)." 〔9〕 Gibson Dunn, "OCC Approves Anchorage Trust's Charter Conversion and Expands the General Fiduciary Powers of National Banks," Client Alert, January 25, 2021. 链接：https://www.gibsondunn.com/virtual-currency-fintech-update-occ-approves-anchorage-trusts-charter-conversion-and-expands-the-general-fiduciary-powers-of-national-banks/ 原文摘录："12 U.S.C. § 27(a), which was enacted in 1978… states that '[a] National Bank Association…is not illegally constituted solely because its operations are or have been required by the Comptroller of the Currency to be limited to those of a trust company and activities related thereto.'… As an example, under the New York Banking Law in 1918, a national bank was prohibited by state law from acting as a fiscal and paying agent in New York, even though doing so was a permissible fiduciary activity for a New York state-chartered trust company. Section 92a was enacted to level this playing field." 〔10〕 OCC官方历史页面："Comptroller Saxon: Innovator, Visionary, Individualist." 链接：https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/who-we-are/history/1936-1966/1936-1966-comptroller-saxon-innovator-visionary-individualist.html 原文摘录："During his tenure, the OCC granted 513 de novo charters between 1962 and 1965… He liberalized lending limits, increased the ability of national banks to compete for real estate loans, allowed trust departments to offer a full range of fiduciary duties, and broadened banks' investment powers." 〔11〕 Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS), "Fiduciary Capacity; Non-Fiduciary Capacity Custody Activities" policy paper. 链接：https://www.csbs.org/policy/fiduciary-capacity-non-fiduciary-capacity-custody-activities 原文摘录："While national banks have been authorized to carry on the business of banking since the passage of the NBA in 1863, national banks were not allowed to engage in fiduciary activities until the passage of the Federal Reserve Act ('FRA') in 1913… Congress required national banks to separately apply for a special permit to acquire fiduciary powers." 〔12〕 Robins Kaplan LLP（引明尼阿波利斯联储 fedgazette 文 "In South Dakota We Trust" 数据）, "Litigating Trust Disputes in South Dakota." 链接：https://www.robinskaplan.com/newsroom/insights/litigating-trust-disputes-in-south-dakota （联储原文：https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/fedgazette/in-south-dakota-we-trust） 原文摘录："In 2013, there were 65 trust companies chartered in South Dakota, most of which had been authorized over the past 15 years, and total assets surpassed $120 billion. Putting that in context, at the same time Minnesota had combined assets of just over $7 billion with three non-bank trust charters, and there had been no new charters since 2005." 另："According to a study from the consulting firm Accenture, baby boomers are expected to transfer approximately $30 trillion in assets to their heirs over the next 30-40 years." 另："the court is required to seal court filings and orders relating to trust actions… protected in perpetuity." 〔13〕 Sterling Trustees, South Dakota's Situs Advantages Over Florida 白皮书. 链接：http://sterlingtrustees.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/S24083-SD-vs-FL-Whitepaper.pdf 原文摘录："In 1983, South Dakota was our first state to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities, recognizing advantages of dynasty trusts by allowing trusts to last perpetually for all assets. [SDCL § 43-5-8] South Dakota was also the first to adopt a Trust Protector statute in 1997, maximizing flexibility of the trust for generations. [SDCL § 55-1B-6]" 〔14〕 Golden Gate University Law Review, "Hiding Money in the United States." 链接：https://ggu.edu/2022/08/06/hiding-money-in-the-united-states/ 原文摘录："In 1983, Governor Janklow rallied for South Dakota legislators to enact rules deregulating the trust industry and South Dakota became one of the first states to allow interests to remain unvested in perpetuity. In 1997, with Governor Janklow still at the helm, South Dakota formed the 'Trust Task Force'… Appointed by the South Dakota Governor, the task force has the 'goal of establishing and maintaining South Dakota's stature as the premier trust jurisdiction in the United States.'" 〔15〕 "A Bellwether of Modern Trust Concepts"（美国信托法评论文章，VLex收录）. 链接：https://law-journals-books.vlex.com/vid/bellwether-of-modern-trust-699960345 原文摘录："When Citibank turned to South Dakota, two emergency bills passed very quickly: one abolishing South Dakota's usury law and the second allowing out-of-state bank holding companies to create South Dakota subsidiaries. This resulted in Citibank moving its credit card operation and approximately 3,000 employees to South Dakota, as well as the eventual establishment of Citicorp Trust South Dakota in 1995, which became a launching pad for the South Dakota trust business. Thereafter, Delaware passed their Dynasty statute in 1995 in response to South Dakota's success marketing its South Dakota Dynasty Trust statute." 〔16〕 The Nation, "Why the Superrich Are Flocking to South Dakota," October 26, 2021. 链接：https://www.thenation.com/article/society/south-dakota-trusts/ 原文摘录："In 1983, South Dakota repealed the rule, which meant that wealth in trusts could grow virtually untaxed…forever… trust lawyers helped draft the language that would become the state's 1995 trust company statute, and then chartered the first trust company in the state. Today, there are more than 100 trust companies in operation, though fewer than 1 million people live in South Dakota." 〔17〕Financial Advisor Magazine, "The South Dakota Story." 链接：https://www.fa-mag.com/news/the-south-dakota-story-27530.html 原文摘录："With 86 public and private non-depository trust companies, South Dakota leads the nation… South Dakota has no corporate, trust or personal income tax. State taxes on an inheritance or transfers at death are constitutionally prohibited." 〔18〕 Zach Kraning, Washington University Journal of Law & Policy（论信托法域竞争）. 链接：https://journals.library.wustl.edu/lawpolicy/article/id/9094/download/pdf/ 原文摘录："Justice Brandeis famously called states the 'laboratories' of democracy… Given that trusts are extremely mobile, and trust settlers have the financial resources to shop around, it seems natural that the industry would be ripe for competition… '[B]etween 1997 and 2000, Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and Rhode Island authorized perpetual trusts. By late 2005,' Colorado, Florida, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming 'had followed suit.'" 〔19〕 South Dakota Public Broadcasting（转引ICIJ与《华盛顿邮报》“潘多拉文件”报道）, October 4, 2021. 链接：https://www.sdpb.org/politics/2021-10-04/investigation-sd-trust-companies-serve-leaders-companies-accused-human-rights-abuses 原文摘录："'South Dakota now rivals notoriously opaque jurisdictions in Europe and the Caribbean in financial secrecy…' the Post wrote… 'Year after year in South Dakota, state lawmakers have approved legislation drafted by trust industry insiders… Customer assets in South Dakota trusts have more than quadrupled over the past decade to $360 billion,' the ICIJ reported. The ICIJ says the U.S. gained more than 200 new trusts between 2000 and 2019 with 81 of them—or nearly 50%—being registered in South Dakota." 〔20〕 SEI Investments Company, 1998年度报告（Form 10-K, SEC档案）. 链接：https://ir.seic.com/financial-reports/sec-filings/content/0001036050-99-000631/0001036050-99-000631.pdf 原文摘录："In 1994, we began to expand our trust technology product line by offering trust back-office processing to assist those who wish to outsource their trust department operations… Initially, community banks were the target market for this product… The market for our trust operations outsourcing consists primarily of bank trust departments ranging in size from start-ups to those managing assets of $10 billion, and selected business lines of trust departments up to $100 billion in assets… At December 31, 1998, we had contracts to perform trust operations outsourcing services to 62 clients. The major strategic issue facing this product line is the continued consolidation of the banking industry, which may reduce the number of potential bank prospects and/or eliminate customers from our user base." 〔21〕 Lexology, "Modern Trust Design"（论定向信托与私人信托公司）, 2021. 链接：https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5b552c8f-ddbf-41ba-84d5-717e6d7c9c09 原文摘录："A private trust company is a company that is qualified to exercise trust powers for the members of a family and their related trusts, companies and charities… New Hampshire and South Dakota allow the formation of private trust companies. New Hampshire allows the formation of licensed and unlicensed private trust companies. South Dakota allows only the formation of licensed private trust companies." 〔22〕 National Association of Estate Planners & Councils (NAEPC), Monthly Technical Newsletter, November 2024. 链接：https://www.naepc.org/events/newsletter/11/2024 原文摘录："South Dakota and New Hampshire have the lowest minimum capital requirement of $200,000 for licensed private trust companies… Tennessee allows a private trust company to request in writing to be exempt from any provision of the Banking Act… Wyoming permits private family trust companies. A private family trust company is not chartered, and it is not subject to regulation by the Wyoming Division of Banking."（另见American Fiduciary Solutions："Generally, regulated PFTCs should anticipate a minimum capital requirement of between $200,000 and $500,000. Regulated public/retail trust companies should generally anticipate a minimum capital requirement of between $400,000 and $2 million."） 〔23〕 Law Offices of Randolf Krbechek（转述Jim Weller与Alan Ytterberg的研究）, "Private Trust Company – A Curious Hybrid." 链接：https://krbecheklaw.com/private-trust-company-a-curious-hybrid/ 原文摘录："By way of history, 'U.S. Trust Company (est. 1853), Northern Trust (est. 1889), and Bessemer Trust (est. 1907) were originally formed as private trust companies, but today they are known and respected as public trust companies that provide a wide range of fiduciary and trust services.'" 〔24〕 JD Supra / Stinson LLP, "OCC Finalizes Amendments to Affirm the Authority of National Trust Banks to Engage in Non-Fiduciary Activities," March 2, 2026. 链接：https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/occ-finalizes-amendments-to-affirm-the-4721315/ 原文摘录："On March 2, 2026, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) finalized amendments to its existing rule on national bank chartering to affirm the authority of national trust banks to engage in non-fiduciary activities, including certain custody and safekeeping activities… The revised regulation takes effect April 1, 2026… The Amended Rule was finalized in the wake of the OCC's conditional approval of several crypto-focused national trust banks." 〔25〕 Trident Trust, A Quick Guide to South Dakota Trusts. 链接：https://tebs.tridenttrust.com/PDFs/TTSD-Quick-Trust-Guide-E.pdf 原文摘录："South Dakota first gained attention as a trust domicile in 1983 when it abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP). Previously, states following the general rule required trusts to terminate at the end of 90-110 years. By abolishing the RAP, assets held in trust can be permanently insulated from the federal transfer tax system—the gift, estate, and generation skipping taxes—allowing the value of the trust's assets to grow more rapidly." 〔26〕 Wealth Advisors Trust Company, "South Dakota Trust Law – 25 Reasons Ranked #1." 链接：https://www.wealthadvisorstrust.com/blog/south-dakota-trust-law-25-reasons-ranked-1 原文摘录："South Dakota trust law timeline: 1983 – first to repeal its Rule Against Perpetuities… 1997 – first trust protector statute. 2007 – first state-adopted Third Party Discretionary Trust statutes… 2011 – first statutorily authorized special purpose entities to serve as trust advisors. 2013 – first to authorize a trust-owned captive insurance company. 2017 – first to modernize virtual representation statutes."（另：SDCL § 43-5-8原文——"The common-law rule against perpetuities is not in force in this state."）
