Ball R, Jayaraman S, Shivakumar L. Audited financial reporting and voluntary disclosure as complements: A test of the confirmation hypothesis[J]. Journal of accounting and economics, 2012, 53(1-2): 136-166.
Abstract: We examine the “confirmation” hypothesis that audited financial reporting and disclosure of managers'private information are complements, because independent verification of outcomes disciplines and hence enhances disclosure credibility. Committing to higher audit fees (a measure of financial statement verification) is associated with management forecasts that are more frequent, specific, timely, accurate and informative to investors. Because private information disclosure and audited financial reporting are complements, their economic roles cannot be evaluated separately. Our evidence cautions against drawing inferences exclusively from market reactions around “announcement periods” because audited financial reporting indirectly affects information released at other times and through other channels.
摘要：我们检验了“确认”假说，即经审计的财务报告与管理层私有信息的披露是互补的，这是因为对结果进行独立核实能够约束管理层行为，从而提升信息披露的可信度。实证结果表明，承诺支付更高的审计费用（作为财务报表核实程度的衡量）与管理层预测披露在频率、具体性、及时性、准确性以及对投资者的信息含量等方面的提升显著相关。由于私有信息披露与经审计的财务报告具有互补性，它们的经济作用不能被割裂开来单独评估。我们的证据提醒研究者，不应仅依据“公告期”前后的市场反应来进行推断，因为经审计的财务报告还会通过其他时间点和其他渠道，间接影响信息的释放。
Highlights
Firms doing more forecasting spend more on audits.
Auditing actual financial outcomes makes forecasts more credible.
Backward-looking financial reporting enhances forward-looking disclosure.
Forward-looking information and audited reports are complements.
Financial reporting cannot be evaluated independently of its effect on disclosure.
要点
进行更多预测活动的企业，其审计支出更高。
对实际财务结果的审计提高了预测信息的可信度。
以历史为导向的财务报告增强了前瞻性信息披露。
前瞻性信息与经审计的财务报告具有互补关系。
财务报告（强制）不应在脱离其对信息披露（自愿）影响的情况下被单独评价。
While early studies in this literature (e.g., Verrecchia, 1982; Diamond, 1985) model public and private information as substitutes, several subsequent studies examine settings where public and private information can be complements. We argue that the extent to which managers’ private information gets impounded into prices depends on the ability of subsequent public information (viz., earnings) to credibly verify the private information.
尽管该领域的早期研究（如 Verrecchia，1982；Diamond，1985）将公共信息与私有信息建模为替代关系，但随后的一些研究考察了公共信息与私有信息可能呈现互补关系的情境。论文认为，管理层私有信息被反映进入资产价格的程度，取决于随后披露的公共信息（即盈利信息）在多大程度上能够对这些私有信息进行可信的验证。
个人总结：论文主要延续会计基础设施那篇论文（Ball, 2001），探讨强制披露与自愿披露之间关系，强制披露质量会约束管理层进行更高质量的自愿披露，即经审计的会计报告如何提升未经审计的自愿性信息披露可信度。
Ball R. Infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient system of public financial reporting and disclosure[J]. Brookings-Wharton papers on financial services, 2001, 2001(1): 127-169.
AI总结：这篇研究探讨了已审计财务报告与管理层自愿披露（如盈利预测）之间的互补关系，而非替代关系。研究者提出了“确认假设”，认为外部审计的独立验证能够约束管理者的行为，从而增强其私有信息披露的真实性与可信度。数据表明，投入更多审计费用的企业，其发布的盈利预测往往更频繁、更准确且更具时效性。此外，资本市场对这类企业的自愿披露反应也更为显著，说明投资者视审计质量为信息可靠性的重要信号。研究结论指出，决策者不应孤立评估财务报表的经济作用，因为高质量审计能通过提升非正式披露渠道的透明度来优化整体信息环境。
