IATA:2026年全球经济风险评估报告总结(附报告下载)_社会热点_资讯

IATA:2026年全球经济风险评估报告总结(附报告下载)

整理 | 王超

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本报告为(IATA)官方发布资料，量化翻译整理总结。本报告涉及环境相关风险、政策与地缘政治风险、债务与金融不稳定风险、军事与安全相关风险、经济指标相关风险、特殊风险-疫情与石油等。报告通过矩阵呈现潜在风险，分析风险发生可能性以及对全球经济可能造成的负面影响程度。旨在扫描风险领域、提高风险意识并推动相关讨论。

环境相关风险

▎核心影响

持续扰乱全球生活、生计与生产力，极端天气、大宗商品价格波动、供应链压力等会影响农业、基础设施、全球贸易及投资流动。加剧粮食和水资源短缺问题，推动移民增加，2024年流离失所者达1.232亿人，较前十年近乎翻倍，无论是否接纳移民都会对边境和支持系统构成压力。

▎能源转型挑战

成功的能源转型需稳定政策与可靠资金支持，不稳定环境下易出现资产闲置、错失机遇的情况，减缓部分地区发展并损害经济增长。

政策与地缘政治风险

▎政策碎片化

多边主义衰退：国际和平研究所（IPI）与经济与和平研究所（IEP）的《2024年多边主义指数》显示，所测五个领域均呈下降趋势，其中和平与安全领域恶化最严重，2022年武装冲突从2013年的39起增至55起。

贸易秩序变革：关税及贸易总协定（GATT）与世界贸易组织（WTO）曾将关税从1947年的约22%降至1994年的5%以下，如今贸易自由化被更碎片化的贸易秩序取代，联合国其他组织也面临相关性下降问题。

航空领域影响：全球民航领域偏离国际民航组织（ICAO）80年全球协调框架的国家和区域政策举措增多，航空运输二氧化碳排放应对框架竞争限制该领域进展，碎片化税收引发竞争扭曲，威胁全球航空网络维护。

历史相似性：当前地缘政治碎片化与1918-1939年两次世界大战间期特征相似，均表现为贸易放缓、债务上升与民族主义抬头。

▎地缘政治紧张

与政策碎片化相互交织，加剧全球经济不确定性，对贸易、投资等领域产生抑制作用。

债务与金融不稳定风险

▎全球债务现状

2024年全球总债务（含主权、企业及家庭债务）占全球GDP比重超235%（IMF数据），为除2020-2021年新冠疫情时期外的历史最高水平；全球平均财政赤字占GDP的5%，公共债务持续上升，占全球GDP80%的国家债务累积速度加快，2014-2024年全球债务增速（约49%）高于GDP增速（46%）。

▎潜在危害

经济政策空间受限：高债务水平使全球经济对利率更敏感，债务偿还负担加重，限制各国根据自身经济状况制定财政与货币政策的空间。

投资与金融稳定受胁：高公共债务挤出投资，企业和家庭更易陷入破产与债务违约，存在金融系统传染风险；全球股市估值高于长期历史均值，美国股市市值与GDP比值显示股权估值相对于整体经济产出偏高，且市场集中度高（“七大科技巨头”自2020年推动标普500指数超50%涨幅），相关股票调整将对更广泛市场产生巨大影响；长期且大规模的经常账户失衡加剧对跨境资本流动的依赖。

▎美国债务相关风险

债务上限问题：2026年11月可能需提高债务上限（当前上限41.1万亿美元），若未能成功提高，美国可能出现债务违约，虽概率低，但将引发全球金融危机，造成灾难性后果。

-政府停摆风险：美国国会自2019年起未通过覆盖整个财年（10月1日-9月30日）的完整常规拨款法案，依赖持续决议案（CR）和综合支出法案维持政府运转，2025年创纪录的政府停摆后，支出授权截至2026年1月30日，2026年政府停摆风险虽有所降低，但仍存在。

区域经济风险

▎当前状况-房地产

房地产行业正从危机向部分稳定过渡，2025年11月新房价格上涨，但二手房价格仍快速下跌，市场仍受供过于求、需求疲软、流动性低困扰；某大型国有开发商为延长即将到期债券偿还期限引发的近期动荡，凸显该行业持续的信贷压力。

▎经济影响

虽不会引发广泛系统性影响，但2026年中国房地产行业仍将拖累GDP增长，并通过限制中国经济增长对全球经济周期产生负面影响。

军事与安全相关风险

▎全球军费开支

2024年全球军费开支达2.7万亿美元（SIPRI数据），较2023年实际增长9.4%，为冷战结束以来最大同比增幅，各地区均有增长，欧洲和中东增幅尤为显著。

▎双重影响

安全保障不可或缺，但高额军费开支存在机会成本，限制其他领域发展；和平可带来“和平红利”，二战和冷战后，各地区“和平红利”使GDP增长约0.6%-0.9%（IMF数据）。

▎网络威胁与人工智能风险

威胁升级：网络威胁频率与重要性不断提升，人工智能增强攻击者能力，地缘政治不稳定提供滋生土壤，数字依赖使供应链和组织面临更大风险。

航空业脆弱性：航空业依赖关键基础设施，全球航空运输网络与其他网络行业均面临较高暴露风险。

人工智能附加风险：除引发经济混乱、就业流失与加剧不平等外，还带来虚假信息、隐私泄露与信任丧失等问题，目前缺乏人工智能创造巨额利润和提高生产力的充分证据，相关效益或需数年才能显现。

经济指标相关风险

▎通货膨胀

总体态势：2026年通胀上升风险温和，得益于GDP增长前景温和、油价平稳及美元贬值，且中国通缩压力为全球带来“输入性通缩”。

上行压力：劳动力短缺、供应链限制、服务价格通胀黏性及关税等因素可能推动物价上涨；宽松财政政策与抗通胀紧缩货币政策相互冲突，政策失误风险较高，可能限制政策利率下调空间（除非GDP增长显著下滑）；气候事件或加剧食品与大宗商品价格波动，可能引发“温和滞胀”（GDP增长停滞但通胀高于多数央行目标）。

▎失业率

异常现象：全球GDP增长处于“平均水平”区间，本应预期失业率上升，但多个经济体失业率仍接近历史低位，2024年全球失业率4.9%（ILO数据），为1991年以来最低；美国就业岗位创造速度放缓，但劳动力市场新增参与者减少，形成“看空型低失业率”，与历史上低失业率伴随强劲经济活动的情况不同。

潜在影响：特定行业薪资可能面临上行压力。

特殊风险

▎疫情风险

疫情不再是“百年一遇”的事件，虽每年发生重大疫情危机的概率约2%（Gavi数据），但全球近10%陆地面积被列为疾病暴发高风险区域；由于对多边组织支持减少，全球对疫情的前瞻性应对、协作及疫苗准备能力不足。

▎石油市场风险

结构性变革：电气化与公路运输更多使用液化天然气（LNG）导致石油需求转移，需求放缓但供应扩张，库存增加，油价面临下行压力；温和的全球GDP增长也抑制石油需求。

中国影响：中国作为全球最大石油进口国，其石油需求增长放缓及对化石燃料需求下降，影响全球原油进口格局、炼油产量及化石燃料基础设施长期投资。

航空业特殊风险：低油价虽总体利好全球经济与航空公司燃油成本，但石油市场结构性变化可能导致部分机场航空煤油供应短缺。

2026年全球经济展望与积极因素

▎总体判断

若不低估上述风险的综合影响，2026年严重经济衰退风险有限，但当前全球经济增长前景疲软，或成为本世纪常态。

▎潜在积极因素

更广泛的和平局面、能源转型成功（充分利用多渠道增长潜力）、全球协作与协调加强，可能成为推动经济向好的“惊喜因素”。

An assessment of risks in 2026: Converging risks and vulnerabilities

As we are approaching 2026, we assess the overarching risks to the global economy that are likely to characterize the new year. Our assessment is purely qualitative, and perception based. It is not meant to be exhaustive nor in any way dogmatic. Our purpose is to scan the landscape, promote awareness, and stimulate conversations.

Chart 1: Risks in 2026

Climate change: Climate change is and will continue to disrupt lives, livelihoods, and productivity around the globe. Extreme weather, commodity price swings, supply chain stresses, etc., can affect agriculture, infrastructure, global trade, and investment flows. A successful energy transition requires stable policies and reliable financing. In an unstable environment, assets can be left stranded, and opportunities can be missed, slowing progress and harming growth in some regions. Associated risks include greater food and water insecurity, and increased migration. The world has turned more hostile towards immigration, despite it being an effective solution for many major economies’ aging populations. The total number of displaced persons reached 123.2 million in 2024, a near doubling over the preceding decade. Both welcoming them and not welcoming them will put pressure on borders and support systems. The reduced commitment to addressing climate issues in a coordinated manner across the world will undoubtedly slow, though not halt, progress on all these fronts.

Policy fragmentation: The International Peace Institute and the Institute for Economics and Peace (IPI-IEP) produce a Multilateralism Index which shows declines across all five domains measured in the 2024 edition. Peace and Security shows the most deterioration, with armed conflicts rising from 39 in 2013 to 55 in 2022. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor the WTO (World Trade Organization), formed in 1995, helped bring tariffs down from around 22% in 1947 to under 5% by 1994. These decades of trade liberalization have now been replaced with a more fragmented trade order. Other UN organizations face a similar loss of relevance. In global civil aviation we can see an increase in national and regional policy initiatives that depart from ICAO’s 80 years of global harmonization. Competing frameworks for addressing \(CO_{2}\) emissions from air transport limit progress in this area, and fragmented taxation introduces competitive distortions and threatens the maintenance of the global network. We find many similarities between the current geopolitical fragmentation and the interwar period (1918-1939), characterized by slowing trade, rising debt, and increased nationalism.

Debt and financial instability: Total global debt (including sovereigns, corporates, and households) is estimated by the IMF at just above 235% of global GDP in 2024, the highest ever barring the covid years of 2020 and 2021. With the average global fiscal deficit at 5% of GDP, public debt continues to rise. In countries that together represent 80% of global GDP, the pace of debt accumulation is increasing. Global debt has risen faster than GDP over the decade to 2024, at around 49% versus a 46% gain in GDP. Such historically high debt levels expose the world economy to greater interest rate sensitivity and debt-service burdens. This also limits the room for conducting a mix of fiscal and monetary policy that countries’ specific economic conditions might warrant. High public debt tends to crowd out investment. Corporates and households are more prone to bankruptcies and defaults on debt payments, which risk contagion across financial systems. Stock market valuations are above long-term historical averages for global equities. In the US, the market-capitalization-toGDP shows that equity valuations are high compared to overall economic output. The high degree of market concentration, particularly in the US, also has significant implications for risk and volatility. The “magnificent Seven”, i.e., Apple, Microsoft, Nvidia, Alphabet, Amazon, Tesla, Meta) have driven over 50% of S&P 500 gains since 2020. Any corrections in these stocks will have outsized impacts on broader markets. Large and persistent current account imbalances add to dependencies on cross-border capital flows. While these factors converge to lift risks in 2026, the probability of a global financial crisis in 2026 remains low to medium.

The US mid-term election on 3 November 2026 could give the Democrats a majority in the House of Representatives, which would curtail the legislative capacity of the Trump administration. However, the risk of turmoil around the election and it possibly being contested is present. In such a context, further instability could surround the need to extend the debt ceiling, likely to be necessary in November (current limit is USD 41.1 trillion). Failure to extend the debt ceiling would risk the US defaulting on its debt payments, which lowlikelihood scenario would have catastrophic consequences and trigger a global financial crisis.

US government shutdown: The last time the US Congress passed a full, regular appropriations bill covering all federal spending for a fiscal year (running from 1 October to 30 September) was in 2019. Instead, government functions with Continuing Resolutions (CR) and omnibus spending bills. Spending authority after the recordlong 2025 government shutdown now runs until 30 January 2026. Logic would have it that a shutdown is now less likely in 2026, though the risk is present.

China’s property crisis: This risk is abating as the property sector is likely to transition from crisis to partial stabilization. New home prices rose in November 2025 but prices in the secondary market are still falling at a rapid rate, illustrating that oversupply, weak demand, and low liquidity continue to plague the market. Recent turmoil surrounding a major state-backed developer’s efforts to extend upcoming bond repayments highlights the lingering credit strains in the sector. While this should not cause widespread systemic impacts, the sector can be expected to remain a drag on GDP growth in China in 2026. To the extent that this limits China’s economic growth, it will also weigh on the global business cycle.

Military spending: Global military spending reached USD 2.7 trillion in 2024. That is an increase of 9.4% in real terms from 2023, which is the steepest year-on-year rise since at least the end of the Cold War. The spending increase occurred across all regions but was especially pronounced in Europe and in the Middle East. While security is unambiguously a necessity, such spending represents an opportunity cost that limits progress in other areas. Peace, on the other hand, can produce a “peace dividend” as economic resources are freed up when military spending falls or wars end. After WWII and the Cold War, the peace dividend added an estimated 0.6 to 0.9% to GDP across regions.

The external value of the US dollar is important to the global economy because of its dominant share in invoicing and cross-border payments. Over the very long term, the USD is a trend-depreciating currency with periods of appreciation. Environments that promote a stronger US dollar are when the Federal Reserve is tightening monetary policy, and when turmoil sparks a flight to safety among investors. Currently, the Fed is in rate-cutting mode, and global uncertainty has rather uniquely favored other safe havens, such as gold and the Swiss franc. Add the lack of fizz in the US economy, persistent budget and current account deficits, and potentially greater reservations about US stock market valuations, the US dollar appears most likely to pursue its depreciation in 2026 against the sum of its trading partners’ currencies (though not against all individual currencies). A weaker US dollar tends to benefit all non-USD-based countries who will pay less in local currency for their USD-denominated debt and trade. This is of course important for air transport where not only fuel but also a wide range of other major costs, including aircraft purchases, lease payments, maintenance, certain airport and navigation charges, global distribution systems, IT services, and more, are typically invoiced in US dollars. Altogether, these USD-denominated expenses can account for more than half of an airline’s operating costs and a substantial portion of its capital expenditures.

Oil: The oil market is undergoing major structural change as demand is shifting in response to electrification and to greater use of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in road transport. Supply is expanding even as demand is slowing, leading to inventory build-up and putting downward pressure on prices. Modest global GDP growth is also weighing on demand. China has an outsized influence on the global oil market as the largest importer in the world. Its reduced demand growth and lower demand for fossil fuels in particular is affecting global crude import patterns, refinery outputs, and long-term investments in fossil-fuel infrastructure. While lower oil prices tend to support global economic activity, and reduce the fuel bill for airlines, the structural shifts in the global oil market poses some potentially counterintuitive risks of lack of supply of fossil jet fuel at certain airports.

The risks of higher inflation are moderate going into 2026, thanks to the modest GDP growth outlook, benign oil prices, and a depreciating US dollar. Moreover, deflationary pressure in China allows the rest of the world to import disinflation. Prices can still grind higher because of labor shortages, supply chain constraints, sticky service-price inflation and, of course, tariffs. Policy runs a greater risk of missteps as loose fiscal policy stands in opposition to any efforts to tighten monetary policy to combat inflation. On balance, this is likely to limit the extent of possible policy interest rate cuts, unless GDP growth falters more noticeably. Climate events will likelydrive volatility in food and commodity prices. This could spell a mild form of stagflation, where GDP growth is stagnant, but inflation remains above most central bank targets.

Cyber threats are growing in both frequency and importance. In this domain too we see a convergence of risks and vulnerabilities with artificial intelligence (AI) enhancing attackers’ capabilities, geopolitical instability providing fertile breeding ground, and digital dependence exposing supply chains and organizations to greater risks. The airline industry’s reliance on critical infrastructure makes the global air transport network particularly exposed, along with all other network industries. AI adds risks related to misinformation, loss of privacy, and erosion of trust, on top of those that might generate economic disruption, job displacement, and greater inequality. Proof of AI generating substantial profits and increased productivity are scarce at the current junction and might take years to materialize.

Higher unemployment would only be natural to expect in a world where global GDP seems to be stuck in the “average” zone. However, rather surprisingly, unemployment rates remain near historic lows in many economies. The ILO reports the global unemployment rate at 4.9% in 2024, the lowest since 1991. In the US, the rate of job creation has slowed, roughly matched by fewer entrants in the job market. This could be described as “bearish low unemployment” while historically such low rates have been associated with more buoyant underlying economic activity. This situation is likely to maintain upward pressure on wages in certain professions.

Pandemic risk is no longer limited to a once-in-a-century event, though the chance of such a crisis is estimated at a low 2% in any given year. Nearly 10% of global land area is currently classified as being at high risk for disease outbreaks. The chances that the world responds to any such event with foresight, collaboration, and vaccine readiness is low given the decline in support for multilateral organizations.

The risk of a severe economic slowdown in 2026 seems limited unless we have underestimated the potential combined effect of the above converging risks and vulnerabilities. However, the current situation spells a period of weakening growth prospects which could come to characterize this century. Positive surprises could come in the form of more widespread peace, a successful energy transition that leverages on all its multiple avenues for growth, and increased global collaboration and harmonization.

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