推广 热搜: 采购方式  滤芯  带式称重给煤机  甲带  气动隔膜泵  减速机型号  无级变速机  链式给煤机  履带  减速机 

【调查报告】TSIB :南海致命碰撞事故详情及安全警示丨海员之家

   日期:2026-01-06 20:38:33     来源:网络整理    作者:本站编辑    评论:0    
【调查报告】TSIB :南海致命碰撞事故详情及安全警示丨海员之家

新加坡运输安全调查局(TSIB)发布了一份2024 年 7 月 19 日南海两船碰撞事故的调查报告,披露了事故经过、成因及安全建议,为航运业安全管理提供重要参考。

▲图源:网络,侵权必删

事故概况

2024 年 7 月 19 日 06 时 02 分左右,新加坡注册的油化船 “Hafnia Nile”(简称 HN)与圣多美和普林西比注册的油船 “Ceres I”(简称 CI)在马来西亚以东的南海海域发生碰撞。

事发时,HN 正朝东北方向航行,CI 处于锚泊状态。

当时天气晴好、能见度良好,风力为 15-25 节(偏强),海流为西北向 2-4 节。

碰撞造成两船船体结构受损,HN 的一个货油舱发生船用燃料油和石脑油泄漏,导致两船均发生火灾。

CI 船上两名岸上工作人员遭受严重烧伤,其中 1 人后续在医院不治身亡。

调查揭示了以下内容:

● 碰撞发生时,HN 试图在 CI 与另一艘西南向航行船舶之间穿行,两船间距约 0.7 海里。

接近过程中,值班驾驶员(HN-2M)在驾驶台后部的海图室准备两份报告(海图室在夜间用窗帘隔开),驾驶台内仅留一名甲板普通船员(HN-ASD2)值守。

● HN 轮的 S 波段雷达最近会遇距离(CPA)/ 最近会遇时间(TCPA)警报被静音,X 波段雷达警报被关闭,导致失去了早期发现会遇风险的重要安全保障。

● 值班驾驶员 HN-2M 从斯里兰卡科伦坡经吉隆坡通宵旅行后抵达新加坡登船,登船后立即接手二副职责并参与锚泊期间的港口作业。

在 38.5 小时内,其休息时间仅约 2 小时(休息被未通知的火警测试打断),随后直接承担 00:00-06:00 时段值班,碰撞发生在该值班时段的最后一小时。

通宵旅行、登船后高强度工作及休息中断导致其大概率处于疲劳状态。

● CI 轮驾驶台团队在 6.4 海里处发现 HN 轮,初期评估风险较低。虽据称使用了视觉和声音信号警示,但在局面升级至紧迫局面时,未通过甚高频(VHF)与 HN 轮沟通。

● CI 轮的安全管理体系(SMS)未明确规定锚泊状态下遭遇紧迫局面时,与接近船舶的沟通方式。

● 附带观察显示,HN 轮驶离新加坡时及在新加坡分道通航制(TSS)区域航行时,驾驶台配员水平(BML)未达到公司 SMS 规定的 5 人及 4 人标准,碰撞发生时配员符合要求。

▲图源:网络,侵权必删

事故结论

● HN 轮值班驾驶员在 00:00-06:00 值班期间,于船舶接近多个目标的关键时段,离开驾驶台处理 IFC(国际海事组织财务委员会)和 AMVER(自动互助船舶救助系统)报告(此类非时效性工作本可延后完成),仅留普通船员值守驾驶台。

将行政工作置于航行职责之上,导致驾驶台团队态势感知能力下降,违反了安全管理体系中 “航行职责不得受非运营任务干扰” 的要求。

● HN 轮值班驾驶员在 38.5 小时内仅获得不足 2 小时连续休息,疲劳状态可能降低其警觉性,影响紧急局面下的判断与操作,是事故重要诱因。

此外,同日登船的另一名船员(HN-ASD1)经通宵国际旅行后立即上岗,反映出新登船人员可能在未充分休息的情况下承担运营职责,疲劳风险具有普遍性。

● 雷达警报功能关闭,导致失去关键安全预警,增加了对视觉观察和人工监控的依赖,而此时船员警觉性已受疲劳影响。

● CI 轮驾驶台团队虽早期发现 HN 轮,但未及时采取预防性措施或沟通,错失风险管控时机;

在局面升级后未使用甚高频(VHF)沟通,未能充分利用国际通用的通信手段澄清态势。

其安全管理体系缺乏明确沟通流程,限制了紧急情况下的应对选项。

● 调查确认,CI 轮岸上工作人员能按指令前往中央控制室(CCR),表明船上安全简报有效,工作人员已掌握基本应急响应技能。

安全建议

针对 HN 轮所属公司

确保航行值班期间 CPA/TCPA 警报始终处于激活状态,在航线规划和交接班时系统检查并确认警报设置,保障紧迫局面的及时识别。

强化航行关键阶段(如离港、分道通航制区域航行)的驾驶台配员标准执行力度,严格遵守公司 SMS 规定;

确需偏离配员标准时,船长需按体系要求记录相关情况。

针对 CI 轮所属公司

在安全管理体系(SMS)中明确规定,遭遇紧迫或时效性强的会遇局面时,应使用的沟通工具(如声号、灯光信号、甚高频无线电等)及操作流程。

英文原文

The Transport Safety Investigation Bureau of Singapore (TSIB) has published an investigation report regarding an incident where two vessels collided in the South China Sea on 19 July 2024.

The incident

On 19 July 2024, at about 0602H, a collision occurred between the Singapore-registered oil/chemical tanker Hafnia Nile (HN) and the São Tomé and Príncipe-registered tanker Ceres I (CI) in the South China Sea, east of Malaysia. HN was underway on a northeast-bound passage and CI was at anchor. 

The prevailing conditions were fair weather with good visibility, fresh winds of 15 to 25 knots, and a north-westerly current of 2 to 4 knots.

The collision caused structural damage to both ships and resulted in the loss of bunker fuel and naphtha cargo from one of HN’s cargo tanks, leading to a fire onboard both ships. 

Two shore workers onboard CI sustained serious burn injuries, and one later died in hospital.

The investigation revealed the following:

● The collision occurred when HN attempted to navigate between CI and another southwest-bound ship that were approximately 0.7 nautical miles apart. During the approach, the Officer of the Watch (HN-2M) was in the chartroom at the aft end of the wheelhouse, preparing two reports. The chartroom was separated by curtains during the hours of darkness. An Able Seafarer Deck (HN-ASD2) was alone in the wheelhouse.

● HN’s S-band radar CPA/TCPA alarms were silenced, the X-band radar alarms were deactivated, which removed an important safeguard for early detection of a reducing CPA.

● HN-2M joined the ship in Singapore after overnight travel from Colombo, Sri Lanka, with a transit in Kuala Lumpur. Upon boarding HN at noon, HN-2M immediately commenced taking-over Second Mate duties and was involved in port activities while the ship was at anchor. When he eventually went for his rest, he had only about two hours of rest over a 38.5-hour period, as his rest was disrupted by an unannounced fire alarm test. He then commenced the 0000-0600 watch, and the collision occurred during the last hour of this watch. 

HN-2M was likely tired from overnight travel, the workload upon joining, and disrupted rest prior to assuming the midnight watch.

● CI’s bridge team detected HN at a range of 6.4 nautical miles away but initially assessed the risk as low. 

Visual and sound signals were reportedly used to warn HN, however, no VHF communication was attempted by CI’s bridge to alert HN when the situation escalated to close quarters.

● CI’s SMS lacked specific guidance regarding the methods to be used to communicate with an approaching ship during a close-quarters situation at anchor.

● An incidental observation revealed that the Bridge Manning Level (BML) of HN did not meet the HN-Company SMS requirement of BML 5 during departure from Singapore and BML 4 while transiting the Singapore Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS). The BML at the time of the allision met the HN-Company SMS requirement.

Conclusions

● During the 0000H–0600H watch, while navigating in close proximity to several targets, HN-2M left the wheelhouse to prepare IFC and AMVER reports, leaving only HN-ASD2 to manage the bridge. These reports were not time-critical and could have been completed later in the day. 

By prioritising administrative work over navigation during a developing traffic situation, the bridge team’s situational awareness was reduced and the watchkeeping arrangement did not align with the SMS expectation that navigation duties must not be disrupted by non-operational tasks.

● HN-2M had less than two hours of uninterrupted rest, in the 38.5-hour period, before commencing the midnight watch, following overnight travel, immediate assumption of duties after joining, and rest disturbance caused by unannounced fire-alarm testing. 

The investigation also noted that HN-ASD1, who signed on the same day, undertook duty shortly after arrival following overnight international travel. These reflected a broader risk that newly joined personnel may commence operational duties before obtaining adequate recovery time, increasing the potential risk for tiredness.

● With only about two hours of rest in a 38.5-hour period, HN-2M was likely experiencing fatigue, which may have reduced his alertness and affected his performance and judgement during the developing close-quarters situation, contributing to the occurrence.

● The S-band radar’s CPA and TCPA alarms had been silenced, and the X-band radar alarms were deactivated. The absence of active alarms removed an important safeguard that could have assisted in detecting the reducing CPA with CI and the southwest bound Target 53, increasing reliance on visual and manual monitoring at a time when alertness may have been reduced.

● CI’s bridge team detected HN at a range of about 6.5 nm and initially assessed the situation as non-critical. 

No early preparatory measures or communication were initiated, despite HN maintaining course and speed on a steady bearing.

● Although this did not amount to a human-element issue on CI, it reflected a missed opportunity for earlier risk assessment.

When no alteration of course or speed was observed from HN, CI’s bridge team reported using sound signals and the Aldis lamp to warn HN. However, these warnings were not acknowledged by HN. 

Despite the escalating risk, VHF was not used as an additional means of communication, which could have supported situational clarification in accordance with internationally recognised practice.

● Although CI-Company’s SMS required the bridge teams to warn approaching ships when they came too close, the SMS did not specify the means of doing so. 

In the absence of procedural guidance, the bridge team relied solely on visual and sound signals, limiting their response options in a time-critical situation. No Human Element issues were identified on CI, however, the lack of procedural clarity contributed to limited use of available resources.

● The ability of the shore workers to proceed to the CCR as instructed indicated that the essential elements of the shipboard safety briefing were understood. 

The investigation considered that the safety briefing was sufficiently effective in preparing them for emergency response actions.

Safety recommendations

For HN-Company

● To ensure that CPA/TCPA alarms remain active throughout navigational watches and that alarm settings are systematically reviewed and confirmed during passage planning and watch handovers, to support the timely identification of developing close-quarters situations. 

● To reinforce adherence to the bridge manning levels prescribed in the Company’s SMS during departure and other high-risk navigational phases, and to ensure that any justified deviation from the prescribed manning level is documented by the Master in accordance with the SMS. 

For CI-Company

To provide clear guidance in its SMS procedures on the use of available communication tools, such as sound signals, light signals, and VHF radio, when responding to developing or time-critical close-quarters situations. 

免责申明:本文来源外网,若有误差,请以英语为准。仅代表作者观点,不代表中国海员之家立场。其真实性及原创性未能得到中国海员之家证实,在此感谢原作者的辛苦创作,如转载涉及版权等问题,请作者与我们联系,我们将在第一时间处理,谢谢!联系邮箱:cnisu@54seaman.com

 
打赏
 
更多>同类资讯
0 条相关评论

推荐图文
推荐资讯
点击排行
网站首页  |  关于我们  |  联系方式  |  使用协议  |  版权隐私  |  网站地图  |  排名推广  |  广告服务  |  积分换礼  |  网站留言  |  RSS订阅  |  违规举报  |  皖ICP备20008329号-18
Powered By DESTOON