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dation as strong as that on which we suppose our belief of an external world, and even of our own identity, to rest. What daring atheist is he, who has ever truly disbelieved the existence of himself and others? For it is he alone who can say, with corresponding argument, that he is an atheist, because there is no relation of cause and effect." " The just analysis, then, which reduces our expectation of similarity in the future trains of events to intuition, we may safely admit, without any fear of losing a single argument for the existence of God." By this doctrine he has separated himself for ever from sensationalists, and given great trouble to those classifiers {328} of philosophic systems who insist, contrary to the whole history of British philosophy, that all systems must either be sensational or ideal. It is quite obvious that such men as Butler, Brown, and Chalmers, cannot be included in either of the artificial compartments, and hence one ground of their neglect by the system-builders of our age.
(3) His account of sensation is characterized by fine analysis: in particular, his discrimination of the sensations commonly ascribed to touch, and his separation of the muscular sense from the sense of touch proper. About this very time Charles Bell was establishing the distinction of the nerves of sensation and motion. " I was finally enabled," says Sir Charles, to show that the muscles had two classes of nerves; that on exciting one of these the muscles contracted, that on exciting the other no action took place. The nerve which had no power to make the muscle contract was found to be a nerve of sensation." Contemporaneously, Brown was arguing, on psychological grounds, that by the muscular sense we get knowledge which cannot be had from mere feeling or touch. "The feeling of resistance is, I conceive, to be ascribed not to our organ of touch but to our muscular frame." Hamilton, by his vast erudition, has been able (note appended to Reid's works) to detect anticipations of these views; but they were not so clearly stated, and they were not conclusively demonstrated. Brown started, and carried a certain length, those inquiries regarding the variety of sensations commonly ascribed to touch, which have ever since had a place in psycho logical treatises.
(4) Nor must we omit his ingenious and felicitous mode of illustrating the succession of our mental states, called by him "suggestion," to intimate that there is no connection in the nature of things between the ideas, and not " association," which might leave the impression that there was a nexus joining them. He is particularly successful in showing how by association the various ideas and, he adds, feelings blend, and, as it were, coalesce. He has called attention to an important phenomenon, which has been little noticed ever since he brought it out to view, and which he himself did not see the significance of. " In our mental sequences, the one feeling which precedes and induces another feeling does not necessarily on that account give place to it; but may continue in {329} that virtual sense of combination, as applied to the phenomena of the mind, of which I have often spoken, to coexist with the new feeling which it excites, outlasting it, perhaps, and many other feeling to which, during its permanence, it may have given rise. I pointed out to you how important this circumstance in our mental constitution is to us in various ways: to our intellectual acquirements, since without it there would be no continued meditation, but only a hurrying confusion of image after image, in wilder irregularity than in the wildest of our dreams; and to our virtue and happiness, since, by allowing the coexistence and condensation of various feelings in one complex emotion, it furnishes the chief source of those moral affections which it is at once our happiness to feel and our virtue to obey." He has here got a glimpse of a great truth, which needs to be developed more fully than it has yet been it is the power of a motive principle, and of a strong purpose and resolution abiding in the mind to sway the train of thoughts and feelings. Had he followed out his own hint, it would have led him to discover deep springs of action directing the flow of suggestions.
While he illustrates the laws of suggestion under the three Aristotelian heads of contiguity, resemblance, and contrast, he intimates his belief that they may all be reduced to a finer kind of contiguity. As the latest speculations have not yet got down to the depths of this subject, it may be useful to know the hints thrown out by Brown, who seems to me to be so far on the right track, but not to have reached the highest fountain from which the stream issues: --
"All suggestion, as I conceive, may, if our analysis be sufficiently minute, be found to depend on prior existence, or at least on such immediate proximity as is itself very probably a modification of coexistence." He begins with resemblance: "if a portrait be faithfully painted, the effect which it produces on the eye that perceives it is the same, or very nearly the same, as the effect produced on the eye by similar light reflected from the living object; and we might therefore almost as justly say, that when any individual is seen by us repeatedly he suggests himself by resemblance, as that he is thus suggested by his portrait." This surely comes very close to Hamilton's principle, that resembling objects, so far as they are alike, are the same, and to his law of repetition or identity. The following brings us quite as near his law of redintegration In many other cases, in which the resemblance is less complete, its operation may, even without such refinement of analysis as that to which I have alluded, be very obviously brought under the influence of contiguity. Thus, as the drapery forms {330} so important a part of the complex perception of the human figure, the costume of any period may recall to us some distinguished person of that time. A ruff like that worn by Queen Elizabeth brings before us the sovereign herself, though the person who wears the ruff may have no other circumstance of resemblance: because the ruff and the general appearance of Queen Elizabeth, having formed one complex whole in our mind, it is necessary only that one part of the complexity should be recalled -- as the ruff in the case supposed -- to bring back all the other parts by the mere principle of contiguity. The instance of drapery, which is but an adjunct or accidental circumstance of the person, may be easily extended to other instances, in which the resemblance is in parts of the real and permanent figure." " In this manner, by analyzing every complex whole, and tracing, in the variety of its composition, that particular part in which the actual similarity consists, -- and which may therefore be supposed to introduce the other parts that have formerly coexisted with it, -- we might be able to reduce every case of suggestion from direct resemblance -- to the influence of mere contiguity." " By the application of a similar refined analysis to other tribes of associations, even to those of contrast, we may perhaps find that it would be possible to reduce these also to the same comprehensive influence of mere proximity as the single principle on which all suggestion is founded." I am far from holding that this analysis into parts of the concrete idea starting the suggestion, furnishes a complete solution of the difficulties connected with fixing on one ultimate law; but it seems to set us on the right track. He gives us a somewhat crude, but still important, classification of what he calls the secondary laws of suggestion, which induce one associate conception rather than another. He mentions longer or shorter continuance; more or less liveliness; more or less frequently present; more or less purity from the mixture of other feelings; differences of original constitution; differences of temporary emotion; changes in the state of the body; and general tendencies produced by prior habits. Had this arrangement been presented by another he would have proceeded to reduce it to simpler elements.
(5) His distribution of the relations which the mind can discover is worthy of being looked at: they are --
I. COEXISTENCE. (1) Position. (2) Resemblance or Difference. (3) Degree. (4) Proportion. (5) Comprehension (whole and parts).
II. SUCCESSION. (6) Casual Priority. (7) Causal Priority.
{331} This classification is worthy of being placed along side that of Locke and Hume. It may be compared with Kant's " Categories of the Understanding; " but it should be observed that the German metaphysician makes his categories forms imposed by the mind on things, whereas the Scotch psychologist simply gives to the mind the power of discerning the relations in things. The arrangement of Brown is superior to that of Hamilton, to be afterwards discussed, and vastly more comprehensive and just than that of those later physiological psychologists who reduce the relations which the mind can perceive to the single one of resemblance and difference, thus restricting the powers of intelligence within far narrower limits than have been assigned by nature, and all to make it somewhat easier to account for the whole on materialistic principles.
(6) His biographer declares his account of the general notion to be a great advance on all that had been proposed by previous philosophers. Brown states the process to be the following: "We perceive two or more objects, -- this is one state of the mind. We are struck with the <feeling> of their resemblance in certain respects, -- this is a second state of the mind. We then, in the third stage, give a name to these circumstances of felt resemblance, a name which is, of course, applied afterwards only where this relation of similarity is felt. " He has here seized some of the characteristic steps in the process of forming the general notion. He is right in giving a prominent place to the discovery of resemblance, but he should have called it a perception of resemblance, and not a feeling of resemblance, -- language which seems to ascribe the whole to the emotive rather than the cognitive part of our nature. And he has missed, after all, the essential, the consummating step,-the placing of the objects under a head or in a class which embraces all the objects possessing the resembling qualities, to which class thus formed the name is given. He has a searching review of nominalism, which be charges with overlooking the resemblance. He asks, " Why do I class together certain objects, and exclude certain others from the class which I have formed? " He shows that the infant must reason before it has acquired language, " He has already calculated distances long before he knew the use of a single word expressive of distance. "
(7) He has some fine remarks on beauty. He separates from {332} Alison, who resolves it into the general feelings of our nature, and argues resolutely that there is an original and unresolvable class of feelings excited by the beautiful. He remarks that in the emotion of beauty, "by a sort of reflex transfer to the object which excited it, we identify or combine our agreeable feeling with the very conception of the object, whether present or absent." He is able to come to the conclusion: " It is mind alone that is the living fountain of beauty, because it is the mind which, by reflection from itself, embodies in the object or spreads over it its own delight. " He overlooks, however, the objective beauty arising from the harmony of sounds and colors, and from proportion and harmony.
(8) Some place higher than any of his other excellencies his eloquent exposition of the emotions,-- an exposition which called forth the laudations both of Stewart and Chalmers, the latter of whom wrote a preface to that part of his lectures which treats of the feelings. He is particularly successful in showing that man is not by his nature and constitution a selfish being, but is possessed of social and benevolent affections. His lectures on the emotions are radiant all over with poetry, and will repay a careful reading much better than many of the scholastic discussions or anatomical descriptions which are furnished in some of the chairs of mental science.
(9) It would be injustice not to add that he has some very splendid illustrations of natural theism, fitted at once to refine and elevate the soul. I have never heard of any youth being inclined towards scepticism or pantheism, or becoming prejudiced against Christian truth, in consequence of attending or reading the lectures of Brown. In note E, appended to his work on " Cause and Effect, " he has a powerful argument in favor of the possibility of a miracle, showing that it is not inconsistent with the intuitive law of cause and effect. " There is no violation of a law of nature, but there is a new consequent of a new antecedent."
Over against these excellencies I have to place certain grave deficiencies and errors.
(1) I take exception to the account which he gives of the very object and end of mental science. According to him, it is to analyze the complex into the simple, and discover the laws of the succession of our mental states. There is a great {333} and obvious oversight here. The grand business of the science of the human mind is to observe the nature of our mental states, with the view of co-ordinating them and rising to the discovery of the laws which they obey and the faculties from which they proceed. Taking this view, analysis becomes a subordinate though of course an important instrument; and we have to seek to discover the faculties which determine the nature of the states as well as the laws of their succession.
(2) In his analysis he often misses the main element of the concrete or complex phenomena. In referring ideas to sensation he neglects to consider how much is involved in body occupying space, and how much in body exercising property; and the account of memory he fails to discover how much is implied in recognizing the event remembered as having happened in time past,-that is, he omits the idea of time. Often, too, when he has accomplished an analysis of a complex state, does he forget the elements, and reminds us of the boy who imagines that be has annihilated a piece of paper when he has burnt it, forgetting that the elements are to be found in the smoke and in the ashes. It is by a most deceitful decomposition -- it is by missing the very <differentia> of the phenomena -- that he is able to derive all our intellectual ideas from sensation and simple and relative suggestion.
(3) He grants that there are intuitive principles of belief in the mind; but he has never so much as attempted an induction of them, or an exposition of their nature and of the laws which regulate them, or a classification of them. In this respect he must be regarded as falling behind his predecessors in the school, and behind Hamilton, who succeeded him in the estimation of students of mental science. The intelligent reader is greatly disappointed to find him, after he has shown so forcibly that there is an intuition involved in our belief in personal identity and in causation, immediately dropping these intuitions and inquiring no more into their nature. He takes great credit for reducing the faculties and principles enumerated by Reid to a much smaller number; but if we gather up all the elements which he is obliged to bring in, we shall find the list to be as large as that of Reid or Stewart. {334}
(4) Thus he represents consciousness as merely a general term for all the states and affections of mind; and then, in order to account for our belief in the sameness of self, he is obliged to call in a special instinct. " We believe our identity, as one mind, in our feelings of to-day and our feelings of yesterday, as indubitably as we believe that the fire which burned yesterday would in the same circumstances burn us to-day, not from reasoning, but from a principle of instinct and irresistible belief, such as gives to reasoning itself all its validity." It is this irresistible belief, involved in the very nature of consciousness, this belief in self and the identity of self, which makes consciousness -- I mean self-consciousness (and not a vague consciousness) -- a separate faculty. This faculty is a source to us of a separate set of cognitions and ideas, the knowledge of self and of the states of self, -- such as thinking, feeling, resolving.
(5) According to Brown, in perception through the senses we look immediately on a sensation in the mind, and not on any thing out of the mind. Hamilton has severely criticised this doctrine. Hamilton had a discriminately searching classification of the forms. which ideal sense- perception bad assumed, and he makes Brown's theory one of the forms of idealism. But the truth is, Brown's doctrine can scarcely be called idealism. It might be appropriately called inferentialism. It is the same substantially as that of Destutt de Tracy and the French ideologists, who, maintaining the existence of body, argued that infants reach a knowledge of it by a process of inference. The argument is unfolded by Brown at great length and with much ingenuity. The mind can never perceive any thing directly but the sensation, but then this sensation as a -- phenomenon must have a cause. He argues this on the principle, perceived to be intuitively certain, that every effect has a cause. The sensation then must have a cause; but then it has not, like some other of our mental states and affections, -- such as our sentiments and perceptions of duty, -- a cause within the mind itself; it must therefore have a cause without the mind, and this cause is matter. It is clear as to this inference, that it will be acknowledged frankly only by those who look on causation as an intuitive conviction. If belief in causation be merely experimental, it is doubtful whether {335} we should ever discover the law to be universal, for by far the greater number of our sensations would be phenomena of which we could discover no cause. We might group the phenomena in some way, but we should not be able to say logically whether they have a cause or not. But leaving this, as perhaps only a doubtful point, we can affirm confidently that even if, by such a process, we could infer that these sensations have a cause, it must be an unknown cause, a cause of which we have no experience. But matter seems to be something known. We certainly have an idea of extension, or rather of something extended -- I would add, a belief in an extended substance. Our belief is not in an unknown cause, but in a known existence,-- known as existing and extended. But we never could reach the belief, we never could reach even the idea of space which we certainly have, by any logical process proceeding on the existence of a sensation. From a sensation, which is unextended, we cannot rise to the idea of an extended thing. Logically and consequentially, Brown's theory of the cognition of matter prepared the way for that of J. S. Mill, who makes our idea of body to be of a mere possibility of sensations.
(6) He overlooks some of the distinguishing attributes of the reproductive powers of the mind. Conception, memory, and imagination are merely exercises of simple suggestion. He does not give the phantasy or imaging power a separate place. "Memory is not a distinct intellectual faculty, but is merely conception or suggestion combined with the feeling of a particular relation, -- the relation to which we give the name of priority." Observe what confusion of things we have here: memory is a " suggestion, " but implies a " relation, " which is represented as a ,feeling;" and "priority," implying the idea of time past, present, and future, comes in so quietly that we are not expected to notice it, though it is one of the most profound of our ideas. In imagination, he overlooks that high intellectual power which binds the scattered images in a unity, often of a very grand character. A simplification gained by overlooking these characteristic qualities is altogether illusive.
(7) In his account of the faculties of relative suggestion, he mixes up two things which ought to be carefully distinguished, -- the suggestion, which is a mere law of the succession {336} of our ideas, and comparison, by which we disco
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